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In a world increasingly connected with equipment permanently attached, the risk
of cybersecurity had rise. Among the various vulnerabilities and forms of exploitation,
the Botnets are those being addressed in this work. The number of botnets related
infections has grown critically and, due to botnets’ increased capacity and potential use
for future infections, a continued development of solutions is needed to strengthen the
protection of networks and systems. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are one of the
solutions that try to follow this evolution. The continuous evolution of tools and attack
forms in order to evade detection, using mechanisms such as encryption (IPSec, SSL) and
diverse architecture and different ways of implementing Botnets create great challenges
to those who try to detect them. In order to better understand these challenges, this
work proposes an architecture to map the behavior of botnets. For this, a topology was
created with several components, such as Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS)
and Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS), aided with information from honeypots for
the detection and analysis of attacks. This approach enabled real data to be obtained
from attempts, some successfully, from Malware infections, with the aim of transforming
systems into Bots and integrating them into Botnets. An exploratory analysis of the data
is performed to verify the detection capabilities and the cases where the components do
not provide correct information. Some methods based on machine learning were also used
to process and analyze the collected data.




Num mundo cada vez mais conectado com cada vez mais equipamentos ligados em per-
manência o risco de cibersegurança tem aumentado. De entre as diversas vulnerabilidades
e formas de exploração continuada as Botnets são as visadas neste trabalho. Os números
de infeções relacionadas com as Botnets têm crescido de forma critica e devido dotar de
maiores capacidades os atacantes e seu grande poder de infeção futura é necessário um
desenvolvimento continuo de soluções para reforçar a proteção das redes e sistemas. Os
Sistemas de Deteccao de Intrusao (IDS) são uma das soluções que tentam acompanhar
esta evolução deste tipo de ameaça. A evolução continua das ferramentas e formas de
ataque por forma a fugir à detecção, utilizando mecanismos como tráfego cifrado (IPSec,
SSL) e arquitectura diversa e formas diferentes da implementação das Botnets levantam
grandes desafios a quem as tenta detectar. Por forma a compreender melhor estes de-
safios, este trabalho propõe uma arquitetura para mapear o comportamento das Botnets.
Para isso criou-se uma topologia com diversos componentes, como Network Intrusion
Detection System (NIDS) e Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS), auxiliados com in-
formação de honeypots para a deteção e análise de ataques. Esta abordagem permitiu
obter dados reais de tentativas, algumas com sucesso, de infeções de Malware, com o
intuito de transformar os sistemas em Bots e os integrar em Botnets. É efetuada uma
análise exploratória dos dados para verificar a capacidade de deteção e os casos em que
os sistemas não fornecem informação correta. Foram também utilizados alguns métodos
baseados em machine learning para tratamento e análise dos dados coletados.
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Among the biggest threats that can be found on the Internet, we can highlight Botnets
as one of the biggest risks. They can infect multiple computers and mobile devicse world-
wide, from common users to complete infection of networks of educational institutions,
government departments and companies.
Mobile devices are increasingly being targeted for malware. A trend that is growing in
the first half of 2018, is the malware pre-installed on the devices. The RottenSys botnet
is responsible for infecting almost 5 million devices [1].
Hosts are infected by Malware and are controlled remotely becoming a Bot, Bots are
aggregated in networks (botnets). The Botmaster is the actor that to control all the Bots
in a Botnet.
In the year 2018, Spamhaus posted a note on its Spamhaus Block List (SBL), recording
about 9500 Command and Control (C&C) with a 32% increase. About 68% of those
C&C are found and hosted on cybercriminals managed servers. The Botnet Controller
List (BCL) is a subset of the SBL containing only IPv4 addresses of bots and C&C
detected, compared with 2016 an increase of 40% and more than 90% over the year 2014,
in Figure 1.1 can be visualized the increase of botnets between the year 2014 and 2018 [2].
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Figure 1.1: Botnet Listings VC BCL listings [2]
There are several types of Botnets with unique architectures and with different ob-
jectives. As they are scattered in the greatest amount possible in devices connected to
the Internet they give huge resources to the Botmasters. Enabling them to perform Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, to capture personal information in the hosts
and use the victim’s computational resources for any action that Botmaster wants to take.
Due to this great diversity of Botnets, it is essential to understand their operation mode
and ways of detecting them.
In a comparison between the first half of 2017 and 2018, depicted on Figure 1.2, it is
registered a decrease on the number of attacks due to the seasonal slowdown generated at
the beginning of the year, but the H1 indicators show a significant increase in attacks [3].
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Figure 1.2: Change in DDoS attack power, 2017-2018 [3]
1.1 Objectives
This section shows the objectives to this work.
Considering the diversity of botnet infections is important to study in depth how they
works, specially on the infection phase of the bots and their coordination from C&C
hosts. The main objective of this work is to analyze how Intrusion Detection System
(IDS) detects Botnets and foster detection improvement.
Considering the main objective, several phases were considered important in the plan-
ning:
• Build an architecture to analyze the traffic of botnets;
• Redirect all recorded logs to a central log server;
• Infecting hosts where Host Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) are configured;
• Analyze network traffic generated by Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS);
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• Analyze logs generated by Honeypots;
• Correlation between the data record in the diverse components;
• Implement machine learning algorithms to improve the detection of botnets.
1.2 Document Structure
This document is constituted by five chapters, the first chapter starts with the intro-
duction, objectives and the structure of this work.
In the second chapter, an analysis of the state in art related, along with explanation
of systems and devices used to develop the work presented.
The third chapter consists of describing and explaining the methodology used for the
creation of a topology in order to capture events from the HIDS, NIDS and Honeypots,
and for the infection and analysis phases.
The fourth chapter explains the procedures followed in the analysis phase using ma-
chine learning algorithms and presents the results.





At the beginning of computer networks, systems were very simple. Over time, the
importance of connectivity grew and systems became more complex. Today there is no
completly invulnerable computer system as it is possible to find many talented hackers,
and consequently, all systems need several ways to ensure security [4]. The following
section describes the Cyber-attacks, their reasons and their types, which can include:
attacks, network scans, malware, Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS).
2.1.1 Motivations
The big expansion of computers use and network usage in the last few years promoted
what we, nowadays commonly know as cyberspace. On this space, diverse things are hap-
pening all the time, not all of them are benign, such as Cyber-attacks which are Internet
Crimes. These cyber-attacks have become a serious problem in the 21st century, and
there are several new techniques being developed, always complex to break the security
systems and to obtain an advantage [4].
The Internet services, like E-commerce, Internet Banking, Social Network and others,
5
6 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
create a huge amount of information, which generally is stored in servers and clouds (i.e.
remote servers). In order to have greater availability and agility to compete in the market,
those Internet services usually have weak security techniques, exposing weaknesses in the
system that can be used to invade and hack them [5].
The biggest challenge to enssure security at information systems is how to keep large
quantities of information, that can be simple data, such as photos, or very complex
and important, such as financial transactions. These different applications operate on
different computers architectures, which produce a large amount of data and require
efficient processes to ensure the security of organizations [6].
2.1.2 Types of Cyber-Attacks
There are many types of cyber attacks and, especially, the attacker relies on common
hacking techniques. Usually, these techniques are not highly effective, so every day new
techniques are being invented. so it’s to important study this and understand how this
works and the different ways an attacker can execute [7]. Next, we identify the most
important ones:
• Recognition and Collection: The invader executes a data gathering and data prepro-
cessing of the system that he will attack. This recognition has three types: active,
passive and sniffing [8].
• Backdoor: It is used to open a door inside the system, which means that is possible
to execute remote commands behind the security system. The Backdoor make it
possible to have a connection with the destination network avoiding any kind of
detection. It is also possible to project a backdoor specifically to avoid any type of
IDS [9].
• Network Scanner: A network scanner is performed to find possible targets and se-
curity failures. This process can be legal or illegal. The legal way proceeds through
authorized people or by network security professionals. They aim to find the breaks,
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afterward correct them and then implement a defense process for new possible at-
tacks. The illegal scan proceeds through malicious people who search for failures to
invade the system [8].
• Malicious Codes: Known as malware, their goals are malicious activities. After the
malware is installed, the attacker has access to the computer with administrator
user, therefore, he can access all the information. The reason for an attacker to cre-
ate a malware normally is to stole confidential information, scam practices, attacks
and also the spam distribution. Two examples of programs are: [8].
Virus: It is usually installed on the computer through the Internet. It can self-
copy on the infected files, spreading quickly. The most common source for virus
infections is the E-mail, where the host gets infected when the malicious email is
opened by the user. Then, the malicious software can access all the user contacts
and self-send to them. Multiple types of virus exist and every day new types are
developed. Some of them can be highlighted: False Alarm, Backdoor, Trojan Horse,
Macro [8].
Spyware: Treated as a spy, it can monitor the infected computer activities and
pass along all the collected information. Spyware programs are also classified as
legal and illegal, the ones that are managed to monitor who uses the machine and
those that are managed to steal sensible information, respectively [8].
• Denial of Service (DoS): When services are not available for being consumed, this
attack can be: coordinated and distributed [8].
DDoS Occurs when several hosts direct an attack to the server, achieving a number
of solicitations bigger than it can support, so the system becomes unavailable [8].
DoS cannot modify the content on computer data, networks, and systems. Regularly
the victim has no idea of the attack, due to the fact that they are just to send requests
to the server. The server attacked after suffering several attacks stop responding to
the legal user and starts only to take care of the attacks [8].
8 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
• Social Engineering: a technique that applies persuasion. The attacker will persuade
the victim to perform a certain action or to give some relevant information. These
actions can cause damage in the entire computer or network, and the main vulner-
ability in those cases is the victim, that has no conscience about the danger on the
Internet[4].
2.2 Security Controls and Mechanisms
The following section approaches some security controls and mechanisms considered
important to the execution of the proposed goals. Starts by the explanation of the device
that typically comes first and is used to protect a network against invasions, the Fire-
wall, followed by the concepts and purpose analysis of the IDS and then of the Intrusion
Prevention System (IPS).
2.2.1 Firewall
Firewall is a security device that can monitor the network traffic. Moreover, it can
block a specific traffic flow based on a set of rules. The Firewall is the first implemented
line of defense on computers against possible attackers [10]. An example the firewall can
be seen in Figure 2.1
Figure 2.1: Firewall
A Firewall can inspect the system, and also allow or block traffic based on state, port,
and protocol. These inspection rules are set by the administrator and can match the
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source address, destination address, and access parameters. The inspections use known
information that comes from previous connections and packets [10].
But these Firewall rules are not enough to prevent all the attacks, due to some archi-
tectural limitations. It only prevent the intrusions from traffic as long as the allowed data
matches to the applied set of rules, otherwise, the firewall will not notice the intruder. To
minimize those limitations the IDS and the IPS are created [11].
The main difference between a Firewall and an IDS is in which layer it analyzes the
package. The Firewall analyzes only two layers of the Open System Interconnection (OSI)
model the network layer and the transport layer. Nevertheless, IDS analyzes the package
body. The OSI model was developed to build network protocols . OSI consist of seven
distinct layers with the fundamental ideas of networking [12].
2.2.2 Intrusion Detection System (IDS)
An IDS detects several Internet attacks on computer networks. It can monitor the
attacks in other hosts and determinate if the attack is random, general or to a specific
computer network. The IDS can analyze the Protocol Data Unit (PDU) all OSI layers
and can report an alert to the administrator or add to a logs list. Moreover, the IDS also
can test the vulnerability of the computer to attacks on others monitored host [13].
IDS represents the next step network security system evolution, where the software has
the functionality to prevent known or unknown attacks. IDS is able to decrypts attacks
in layers that a Firewall cannot[14]. Can be seen in Figure 2.2
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Figure 2.2: Intrusion Detection System Architecture
The IDS can be classified into two types:
• Based on signatures;
• Based on anomalies.
The ones that are based on signatures work with a table of known signatures of
possibles attack or with access rule. It has a fast identification mechanism but requires
a database that has to be frequently updated [15]. and regularly are created an large
number new signatures, for this reason the method based on signatures can be limited
The anomalies based method, collects the current network traffic and after a period
the system make an analysis, for all the assumed not regular and the can sends an if
something is wrong. This is a robust method because all the unknown attacks can be
prevented, and it biggest disadvantage are the false positives, because a not regular traffic
is not necessarily an attack [15].
The hybrid system can combine both techniques, but they are more complex systems,
implementing many restrictions or limitations to filter the maximum threats [16].
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2.2.3 Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)
Considered as an extension of IDS, an IPS can be seen in the image 2.3. Can monitor
the network traffic and search for malicious activities. The main difference is that IPS is
installed in-line, which means that it stays in the communication path between the source
and the destination, actively analyzing the traffic and reporting or blocking an intrusion
that was detected [17]
The IPS is an active solution system, unlike the IDS which is passive. IPS analyzes
the Logs generated by the IDS and takes active measures, like blocking Internet Protocols
(IP) packets or alerting the Firewall to block inboard or outboard data [18]. IPS is
able to operate invisibly on a network, and offers deep watch and monitor bad logons,
inappropriate content, bad behavior among others [19].
Figure 2.3: Intrusion Prevention System Architecture
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2.3 Honeypot
Honeypot is a tool to collect information about the attacker through a trap, it can
be just a simulation of a system or a host that can give false access to the attacker. The
following section has the explanation about the Honeypot, its types and where they can
be installed, can be seen in the Figure 2.4.
Honeypot services have basically high and low interaction. High Interaction happens
when the system has all the services simulated. The intruder will hardly notice that the
machine is a Honeypot, that can be dangerous knowing that the attacker will have access
to a machine, likewise, it is possible to obtain extra information about the attacker [15].
The low interaction is the opposite, it is characterized by a system that clones real
services where the attacker will not have real access. The critical issue with this approach
is that a knowledgeable attacker will quickly realize that it is a Honeypot and abort the
attack, however, it is possible to capture some data [15].
Figure 2.4: Honeypot Architecture
There are mainly two types of Honeypots: research and production.
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The function of a research Honeypot is to be an attacking target and to collect infor-
mation and intelligence about general threat organizations. It is often used for academic
research, by enterprises and by all researchers/professionals that want to improve their
skills. It enables to attract and study new methods and tools used by attackers.
Usually, the research Honeypot is from high interaction type, considering that its goal
is precisely to study what the attacker is looking for in the system [20].
The production Honeypot detect and save data from some intrusion that might occur.
With the collected data it is possible to improve the defenses against future threats. Pro-
duction Honeypots an mostly used by companies, due to its immediate security provision,
and easier deployment [20].
The Honeypot can be placed:
• Before the Firewall: Precisely to be the first target, and to capture extended infor-
mation of the attacker.
• Inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ): The Honeypot stays together with other
servers, so the attacker can find it, strikes it and falls into the trap.
• After the second Firewall and together to the internal network: This Honeypot
aims to catch possible attackers on the internal network that can be performed by
employees or people with access to the local network.
It is the responsibility of the administrator to analyze which is position to their net-
work. The Honeypot’s risk is the condition where an attacker is able to gain access and
manage the network to arrange more attacks [15].
2.4 Botnet
This section will introduce the Botnets, its function and how it works, the basic
components that integrate its architecture, its infrastructures, that can be centralized,
decentralized and hybrid and the life-cycle of a botnet.
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Botnets are one of the biggest threats to the Internet users. They are formed by several
hosts that work to a determined person: the Botmaster. The hosts that are participating
on the botnet are receiving and transmitting information from a C&C [21].
Botnets are like a computer army waiting for commands to act maliciously and one of
the botnet’s biggest advantage is its anonymity because the infected components do not
belong to the attacker, therefore, identify the actual attacker is difficult. Notwithstanding
each bot can be anywhere in the world acting distributed [22].
To expand the reach of botnets, they infect new vulnerable systems, as more systems
become infected, it becomes a massive activity, and consequentely, offer a significant
threat to the Internet and business companies [23].
2.4.1 Botnet’s Basic Components
Botnets are networks of bots, which are remotely managed by the botmaster through
the C&C. The botnets have some basic components, which are:
• Bot: Malware installed on the user host, usually used to malicious actions.
• User host: Physical or virtual machine infected by the bot.
• C&C: Command & Controler Server it is the way that the botmaster communicate,
sends/receives information and commands to the bots.
• Botmaster: An individual who controls the bots, sending/receiving information and
commands to a possible attack [24].
2.4.2 Infrastructure
A C&C server is the most relevant component for a Botnet infrastructure. Through it
the bots receive the information and mandatory all bots must have an active connection
to the server. This structure has two approaches, centralized and decentralized [22].
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Centralized Architecture
Centralized architecture is compatible with the client-server model Figure 2.5, which
bots are clients sending requests to the server and, consequently, the system gives his
instructions, which brings stability to the network and fast response time [22].
Bots have an individual connection with the server and the Botmaster controls it.
With to this direct connection, it is possible to send simultaneously commands to all
bots, moreover to monitor the number of bots in the network [22].
Figure 2.5: Centralized Architecture of a Botnet
The Internet Relay Chat Internet Relay Chat (IRC) protocol is still widely used to
support the communication in centralized architectures. The main advantage of this
protocol is that the number of bots is not limited, allowing thousands of it being added
to the parallel network [25].
asdasdasdasdad IRC is basically text, so it is possible to create private conversations
with hosts individually, originating a more specific manipulation, consequently needing
to implement only one IRC instruction subset [25].
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Another used protocol for Botnets with a centralized architecture is the Lypertext
Transfer Protocol (HTTP). As it is the most used protocol on the Internet for data
delivery, it has a great availability and its contents are usually rightful. This protocol
uses weak filtration leaving a breach to the Botmaster control the network. These HTTP
Botnets do not hold a connection to a C&C server, the bots uses regular intervals to
contact the server, configured by the Botmaster [25].
Decentralized Architecture
With the advances in detection techniques, the centralized architecture could not
provide a complete protection of the identity, therefore, a new decentralized architecture
was created, shown in Figure 2.6 [22].
Figure 2.6: Decentralized Architecture of a Botnet
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The decentralized architecture has no central C&C servers. Each bot is directly con-
nected to another. The biggest benefit of this approach is the difficulty in locating the
Botmaster, due to the big number of bots. On the other hand, the reaction time is longer
because there is no central command to give the information [22].
P2P is the most common type of decentralized Botnet. In this architecture the bots
work as a client as well as a server. The Botmaster uses a special key to send the commands
to the bots, and even if the bots are off line, the Botnet remains working under the control
of the Botmaster [26].
Hybrid Architecture
The Hybrid architecture uses components of both centralized and decentralized archi-
tectures 2.7. With this architecture, it is possible to obtain the advantages of both: the
efficiency of the C&C server, from the centralized and the practicality of the anonymity,
from the decentralized. This type uses HTTP, IRC, and P2P protocols to attend all the
Botmaster needs [27].
The most progressive and demanding communication to protect a network is consid-
ered the Hybrid P2P, that possess the ability to exchange information and services to
each other. Its three parts that are: Botmaster, Social Websites, Bot Group [28].
The Figure 2.7 shows a diagram explaining the process, that consists of the Botmaster
implementing a malicious code into the website, then the servant bot or C&C obtains the
malware information to send to the client bot. After receiving this information, the client
bot attacks the target [28].
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Figure 2.7: Hybrid P2P Architecture - Adapted from [29]
2.4.3 Botnet Life-Cycle
Usually, the botnets have regular steps or a similar behavior in the recruitment of
vulnerable systems and to managed that, therefore, it has a life-cycle [20]
The typical botnet life-cycle has five phases Figure 2.8. In the initial infection phase,
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the Botnet search for vulnerabilities through a scanner of a possible target and then to
infect with different methods. After the infection, starts the secondary injection phase,
while the target becomes the bot. Through the chosen method to infect, it searches on
a network the actual bot binary malware. The bot binary installs itself on the host, and
after the installation, the host starts running the program making the host into an actual
bot [27], [30].
On the connection phase, the bot establishes a C&C channel, while this process runs
over and over, and this is a critical phase, due to its necessity. In the malicious command
and control phase the target bot becomes a Botnet army, responding to the Botmaster
commands. The last phase is the maintenance and update, the Botmaster needs to
maintain the Botnet active and updated while to avoid new detection techniques [27],
[30].
Figure 2.8: Botnet Life-Cycle - Adapted from [30]
2.5 Machine Learning Algorithms
The Artificial Intelligence (AI) enables machines to learn and think. The machine
apprenticeship is a subfield of the AI study. There are many techniques in Machine
20 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Learning used to classify data sets: Supervised, Unsupervised, Semi-Supervised, Rein-
forcement, Evolutionary Learning, and Deep Learning [31]. These techniques will be
explained in this section.
• Supervised Learning: It is a very common technique that, can easily deduct a
classification problem. The purpose is to make a computer learn a classification
that the user has created. The supervised is able to map the inputs to desired
outputs. With a pre-determined classification, supervised learning is very used for
training neural networks and decision trees [32].
• Unsupervised Learning: The goal in this technique is to teach the computer how to
solve a problem without knowing patterns. The unsupervised tries to find similari-
ties in the data and classify them [32].
• Semi-supervised Learning: This technique is between supervised where and unsu-
pervised, some provided information is supervised but not necessarily all. A very
relevant prerequisite is whether the distribution of examples, decoded with help
from unlabeled data, will be relevant to the classification problem [33].
• Reinforcement Learning: The process of this technique is essentially when the ma-
chine learns by trial and error, and by this, it can predict and acquire rewards. That
is a complex overview, due to on the computer field action we have long-term effects
on future rewards [34].
• Evolutionary Learning: Through the knowledge that this kind of technique obtain
and exploit, it develop the ability to upgrade itself. The algorithm works better
when is applied to populations instead an individual systems. On evolutionary
learning, to improve its performance, the training on a human-designed environment
is significant [35].
• Deep Learning: Deep Learning is a subset of AI whose function is to try to imitate
the behavior and functioning of the human brain, such as in data processing, pattern
making and decision making based on their knowledge.[36]
Chapter 3
Development
This chapter describes the methodology used on this dissertation. It consists in the
creation of a network topology to detect Malware in a network of the communications
laboratory at Instituto Politécnico de Bragança (IPB), which is a controlled environ-
ment where this implementation was realized. All files can be found in the repository
"https://drive.google.com/open?id=1IVRIhCctw2EV0mVTlGS3X2yETH5dtPhp".
Topology is the definition of how the systems are connected, what is the arrangement
among the devices of the computer network that is developed [37]. The following sections
explain why this topology was used, why these devices where chosen, how it was developed,
also each device function and their operation mode.
The sequence of activities developed were the following:
• Step 1: Creating the Topology;
• Step 2: Host infecting with Malwares;
• Step 3: Centralization of the logs for the central server;
• Step 4: Treatment of raw data for noise reduction and improve classification;
• Step 5: Correlation between the data obtained;
• Step 6: Implementation of Machine Learning Algorithms for Automation in Ana-
lyzes;
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3.1 Topology
The first step consists of creating a topology, with the objective of obtaining a complete
and diversified database through the logs and alerts generated by the devices connected
to the network.
The devices have different functions to cover the maximum of Malware behavior,
enabling to find patterns in their activities, to make behavior analysis and to classify the
acquired data with machine learning algorithms. In Figure 3.1 is possible to understand
the connection between the devices used on the proposed topology. The table 3.1 shows
the chosen implementation for each topology components.
Figure 3.1: Proposed Network Topology
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Each implementation is briefly characterized as follows:
• NIDS - Suricata
The chosen NIDS was Suricata version 4.0.5, a new generation Open Source NIDS,
which has a powerful detection motor with signature rules. If these rules are trig-
gered, the network administrator is informed and the alert generated is sent to an
e-mail or to a central server. Suricata is also compatible with many devices, having
a unified platform, that helps interconnections.
Suricata was installed on the gateway together to the Firewall Pf-Sense. This Fire-
wall Pf-Sense was already configured on the network and Suricata is compatible
with it. On this process, a copy of traffic was redirected to Suricata and then it
performed analyzes. As the detection was made on a copy of the traffic no latency
was added to the network.
• HIDS - OSSEC Client/Server
The chosen HIDS was the OSSEC 2.9.9, based on a client-server system and it is
Open Source. Its function is to for instance: actions inside a specific host, the files
activities, monitor the integrity and the initialized processes. The OSSEC has a
detection motor based on signatures, thus it can send the generated alerts by e-mail
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or Syslog, which is a tool for network devices to send alert messages to a logging
server.
– Ossec-Server was installed on a VMWare machine with distribution Ubuntu
16.04
– Ossec-Client was installed on a VMWare machine with distribution Windows
10
• Log Server - Graylog The log server used was Graylog 2, which was installed on
a Debian Server. Graylog 2 is a highly interactive log server, which makes easier
the visualization of registered logs and it is compatible with several devices and log
syntaxes.
On Graylog 2 it is possible to visualize data on graphics (Figure 3.2), is also possible
to do a deep search with specific fields restrictions, as a specific IP, message name,
among others. There is a graphic user interface, which allows users to interact with
it.
• Inter Honeypot - HONEYPI
The honeypot used on the intern network was the HoneyPi. this honeypot was
chosen because the system was configured on a RaspberryPi, as in Figure 3.3, show
that it is possible to obtain an efficient honeypot with a low-cost device. The
HoneyPi is a low interaction honeypot, which registers the connection attempts as:
– Port Scanning Activity;
– Connection FTP attempt;
– Connection Telnet attempt;
– Connection VNC attempt;
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Figure 3.2: Graylog 2
Figure 3.3: RaspberryPi
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• Extern Honeypot - Dionaea
The extern honeypot was the Dionaea. It can emulate and provide services as Semi-
Structured Query Language (SSQL), MY Structured Query Language (MYSQL),
Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) among
others. Dionaea also makes a copy of the binary of the malware, which has infected.
It was installed on a WMWare machine with an Ubuntu 14.06 distribution.
3.2 Host infection
Step 2, consists on the infection of a Windows Virtual Machine, where the HIDS
OSSEC-Client is installed. The malware was found on the [38] repository site you see in
Figure 3.4, this repository has a huge amount of botnet binaries with more than three
hundred samples.
The Malware used was available from a public repository, it could happen that the
C&C server would be already known and, consequently, it may be disabled. Thus the
virtual machine cannot obtain the answers from the requests to the C&C server. When
an OSSEC-Client rule is triggered, an alert is sent, informing what is happening on the
computer like a new resource installation or a service initialization.
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Figure 3.4: Repository Site "www.stratosphereips.org"
3.3 Logs Centralization
Step 3 consists on logs centralization. After the alert is sent, the messages are redi-
rected to the OSSEC-Server, that is responsible for saving the alerts generated by OSSEC-
client and sending them to Graylog. OSSEC-server is also as a possible victim for the
botnet to infect and perform its actions.
Once that the virtual machine which has the OSSEC-Client is infected, it may scan
the network and try to infect other devices to the botnet. HoneyPi waits for this infections
to register all connection attempts and send the logs to the Graylog server. When the
network scanner happens, HoneyPi sends its alerts, informing about this activity.
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Dionaea, which is the Honeypot on the external network, search for activity from
malware that may try to connect to the IPB network, and when it receives an attack it
logs the messages to the Graylog server.
Suricata remains on the network with the PfSense, receiving a copy of traffic to perform
its analyzes. Once that a Suricata rule is triggered, it sends an alert and the copy of
original PfSense traffic directly to the Graylog. After sending the logs, the Graylog
receives of data from all the devices simultaneously, as represented in the Figure 3.5
Figure 3.5: Graylog 2 - Analyzes of data from the devices
3.4 Data Analysis
Step 4 is the phase where methods and procedures were executed for preparing the
data for analysis. From August sixteen to September nine of 2018, the network traffic was
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stored in Packet Capture (.pcap) files from the host where the OSSEC client was installed,
for future analysis. A total of 1.089.387 suricata alerts were acquired as is shown in the
Figure 3.6 and in the Table 3.2. These data are the records of all alerts that it provided
on the internal network traffic.
Figure 3.6: Suricata alerts
The OSSEC data client and server registered a total of 6.160 alerts, as seen in the
Figure 3.7. These alerts are the records of the activities that the hosts suffered in the
monitored time interval, ans the messages is shown in Table 3.3.
Figure 3.7: Ossec Alerts
The data from the internal honeypot were recorded a total of 30.833 alerts, seen in
the Figure 3.8 and in Table 3.4.
Figure 3.8: HoneyPi Alerts
The data from the external honeypot were recorded a total of 12.803 alerts, as seen
in Figure 3.9 and Table 3.5.
30 CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT
Table 3.2: Exemple Suricata Alerts
TIMESTAMP SOURCE MESSAGE
2018-09-06T12:52:42.400Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-06T13: 52: 42 + 01: 00 dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt
suricata 89535 [1: 2019980: 3] ET POLITICAL
Possible IP Check myexternalip.com




0 2018-09-01T01: 43: 57 + 01: 00 dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt
suricata11939 [1: 2402000: 4924] DROP E DROP
Blocked Listing Source Group 1




suricata dhclient 473 DHCPDISCOVER
on enp3s0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 6
2018-09-01T00:44:35.502Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T01:44:35.502554+01:00
suricata dhclient 473 DHCPDISCOVER
on enp3s0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 9
2018-09-01T00:44:44.505Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T01:44:44.504739+01:00
suricata dhclient 473 DHCPDISCOVER
on enp3s0 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 12
2018-09-01T00:45:06.192Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T01: 45: 06 + 01: 00 dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt
suricata 11939 [1: 2402000: 4924] DROP ET DROP
Blocked Listing Source Group 1
[Classification: Mixed Attack] [Priority: 2]
{TCP} 176.119.7.26:55028 ->193.136.195.94:63017
2018-09-01T00:45:27.836Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T01: 45: 27.836316 + 01: 00
suricata dhclient 473 DHCPDISCOVER
on enp3s0 a 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 3
2018-09-06T12:53:15.286Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-06T13:53:15.286566+01:00
suricata dhclient 472 DHCPDISCOVER
on enp3s1 to 255.255.255.255 port 67 interval 7
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dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt dhcpd - DHCPREQUEST
for 192.168.0.184 from 00:0c:29:4c:5a:af
(ossec-virtual-machine) way in 1
2018-09-01T00:53:39.673Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T01:53:39+01:00
dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt dhcpd - DHCPACK
on 192.168.0.184 to 00:0c:29:4c:5a:af
(ossec-virtual-machine) way in 1
2018-09-01T02:07:10.000Z ossec-virtual-machine OSSEC HIDS: [18107, 3] WindowsLogon Success
2018-09-06T13:10:04.000Z ossec-virtual-machine OSSEC HIDS: [18103, 5] Windowserror event.
2018-09-01T02:43:24.611Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T03:43:24+01:00
dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt dhcpd - DHCPREQUEST
for 192.168.0.184 from 00:0c:29:4c:5a:af
(ossec-virtual-machine) way in 1
2018-09-01T02:43:24.611Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T03:43:24+01:00
dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt dhcpd - DHCPACK
on 192.168.0.184 to 00:0c:29:4c:5a:af
(ossec-virtual-machine) way in 1
2018-09-01T03:42:50.544Z 127.0.0.1
0 2018-09-01T04:42:50+01:00
dmz-lc.estig.ipb.pt dhcpd - DHCPACK
on 192.168.0.184 to 00:0c:29:4c:5a:af
(ossec-virtual-machine) way in 1
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Table 3.4: Example HoneyPi Alerts
TIMESTAMP SOURCE MESSAGE
2018-09-01T00:48:43.000Z HoneyPi




LEN=229 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=128
ID=18306 PROTO=UDP SPT=138 DPT=138
LEN=209
2018-09-01T00:51:34.000Z HoneyPi HoneyPi kernel: [1605297.907795] Under-voltage detected! (0x00050005)
2018-09-01T00:52:25.000Z HoneyPi




LEN=105 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=1
ID=16230 PROTO=UDP SPT=5353 DPT=5353
LEN=85
2018-09-01T00:54:39.000Z HoneyPi HoneyPi kernel: [1605483.028480]Voltage normalised (0x00000000)
2018-09-01T00:54:33.000Z HoneyPi HoneyPi kernel: [1605476.788442]Under-voltage detected! (0x00050005)
2018-09-01T00:56:33.000Z HoneyPi HoneyPi kernel: [1605597.428885]Under-voltage detected! (0x00050005)
2018-09-01T00:59:38.000Z HoneyPi HoneyPi kernel: [1605782.549562]Voltage normalised (0x00000000)
2018-09-01T01:02:07.000Z HoneyPi




LEN=76 TOS=0x00 PREC=0x00 TTL=56 ID=0
DFPROTO=UDP SPT=123 DPT=59111 LEN=56
Figure 3.9: Example Dionaea Alerts
The data sent to the Graylog usually uses pre-defined formats by their systems, making
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on eth0 to 192.168.0.254 port 67
(xid=0x462bee02)
them different from each other as can be seen on the following example.
• Suricata: 2018-09-06T12:52:42.400Z 127.0.0.1 0 2018-09-06T13:52:42+01:00 dmz-
lc.estig.ipb.pt suricata 89535 [1:2019980:3] ET POLICY Possible IP Check myex-
ternalip.com [Classification: Potential Corporate Privacy Violation] [Priority: 1]
TCP 192.168.0.162:59137 -> 78.47.139.102:80
• OSSEC: 2018-09-06T16:50:06.000Z ossec-virtual-machine OSSEC HIDS: [18107, 3]
Windows Logon Success.
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• HoneyPi: 2018-09-01T08:30:42.000Z HoneyPi kernel: [1632845.991561] IN=eth0
OUT=MAC=b8:27:eb:ba:2f:e3:00:0c:29:55:35:40:08:00:45:00:01:6b:ed: 88:00:00:40:11:
08:e2 SRC=192.168.0.254 DST=192.168.0.201 LEN=363 TOS=0x00 PREC= 0x00
TTL=64 ID=60808 PROTO=UDP SPT=67 DPT=68 LEN=343
• Dionaea: 2018-09-01T01:23:19.000Z sysadmin-virtual-machine dhclient: DHCPRE-
QUEST of 192.168.0.203 on eth0 to 192.168.0.254 port 67 (xid=0x462bee02)
It is necessary to standardize the data to enable further analysis, such as correlation
between events. For the pertinent information of the captured data, an algorithm was
applied to subdivided the original message into 11 columns with a total of 1.022.493,
as seen in Table 3.6. Messages that did not meet the required characteristics, such as
system errors and Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) server requests, were
also removed.
Table 3.6: Transformation of suricata messages
Field Description
Source Source (system) that generated the alert
Date Date of the alert
Time Time of the alert
Message Message of suricata’s alert, specifying the rule that triggered the alert
Classification Alert Classification
Priority Priority Level. As low is the value higher is the priority
Protocol Protocol of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Source IP Source IP of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Destination IP Destination IP of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Source Port Source Port of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Destination Port Destination Port of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Ossec messages were subdivided into source, date, time and message, being shown in
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Table 3.8: Example of OSSEC results
Source Date Time message
Ossec 2018-08-26 22:52:38.000 Windows Logon Success
Ossec 2018-08-26 06:36:26.000 Log file rotated
Ossec 2018-08-26 16:07:55.000 System time changed
Ossec 2018-08-16 22:03:25.000 Windows Logon Success
Ossec 2018-08-26 23:03:32.000 Windows Logon Success
Ossec 2018-08-17 03:53:06.000 Login session opened
Ossec 2018-08-20 23:21:18.000 Registry Entry Added to the System
Ossec 2018-08-20 23:21:18.000 Registry Entry Added to the System
Ossec 2018-08-27 21:52:36.000 Windows Logon Success
Table 3.7 and in Table 3.8 is shown an example of the result, the total of alerts are 5295.
Table 3.7: Transform Ossec data
Field Description
Source Source (system) that generated the alert
Date Date of the alert
Time Time of the alert
Message Message of Ossec’s alert, specifying the rule that triggered the alert
The messages of HoneyPi were divided into 6 columns, as described on Table 3.9, with
a total of 14818 alerts.
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Table 3.9: Transform HoneyPi Data
Field Description
Source Source (system) that generated the alert
Date Date of the alert
Time Time of the alert
Source IP Source IP of system registered in log file
Destination IP Destination IP of system registered in log file
Protocol Protocol used during the communication that was registered
The messages from Dionaea were subdivided into 5 columns and can be seen on Ta-
ble 3.10.
Table 3.10: Transform Dionaea Data
Field Description
Source Source (system) that generated the alert
Date Date of the alert
Time Time of the alert
Source IP Source IP of system registered in log file
Destination IP Destination IP of system registered in log file
3.5 Correlation
Step 5 is the correlation analysis between the obtained data to find if some of the
activities found are caused by the same event. It was decided to analyze 3 correlations:
• First: Suricata x OSSEC
• Second: Suricata x Honeypot (Honeypi)
• Third: OSSEC x Honeypot (Honeypi)
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Tthe first was to correlate Suricata data with OSSEC. After all the data were pro-
cessed, the parameters used for this correlation were Date and Time. An algorithm was
developed for this correlation where, it searches first the dates in the fields to filter by day,
then the same thing was done with hour and minutes. In the field of seconds an interval
of 2 seconds was stipulated for incorporating some delay in the alarm trigger time or
associated execution. A total of 3112 correlated alerts with the stipulated parameters are
shown in the Table 3.11.
Table 3.11: Correlation data
Field Description
Date Alert Date
Suricata Time Time of suricata’s alert
OSSEC Time Time of OSSEC’s alert
Suricata Message Message of suricata’s alert, specifying the rule that triggered the alert
OSSEC Message Message of Ossec’s alert, specifying the rule that triggered the alert
Classification Suricata’s alert Classification
Source IP Source IP of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Destination IP Destination IP of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Source Port Source Port of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
Destination Port Destination Port of the packet that triggered suricata’s rule
The honeypot data were submitted to the same analysis parameters as Suricata and
OSSEC data, with the interval of 2 seconds between the logs, but no correlation was found
between them. Possible reasons for this event will be discussed further.
3.6 Implementation of Machine Learning Algorithms
Step 6 is the last step in data analysis step. In this section we explain the application
of classification algorithms over the data from Suricata and OSSEC alerts. Since was not
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possible to know exactly what is the predominant characteristic for botnet detection, was
opted for the implementation of unsupervised learning algorithms to find patterns.
For this classification, the k-means algorithm was used. It is used when we do not
know the classification of the object. It uses the method of grouping (Cluntering) for this
classification of objects.
A cluster is a group of data, where each cluster has similarities with each other. The k-
means algorithm uses these similarities to group the data into clusters, where the number
of centroids (central points of the groups) is equal to the number of clusters as seen in
the Figure 3.10.
Figure 3.10: Example K-means
When the first interaction of the algorithm occurs, the average distance of all objects
between the centroids is calculated. The centroids are positioned in the center of the
objects belonging to each centroid. This interaction can occur changes in the centroids
and objects, depicted in Figure 3.11.
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Figure 3.11: Example K-means after the first interaction
This process occurs N times where, N being the number of times the user stipulates.
At the end of the process, the clusters were in the center of the objects of their respective
classes as in Figure 3.12.
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Figure 3.12: K-means completed
The software used for the implementation of k-means was Orange-canvas, with visual
programming without the need for coding, an open source software with very diversified
interactivity and simplicity of use [39]. Figure 3.13 shows the assembled architecture for
the analysis of the data and implementation of the algorithms.
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Figure 3.13: Topology Orange-Canvas
The sequences used in actions on orange-canvas are as follows.
The first step is to import the CSV file with the data to be analyzed, this data is the
correlation between the Suricata and OSSEC. The features chosen for the analyzes are
the Suricata Alert Classification, the source IP, the destination IP, the Source port, and
the Destination port. As the orange canvas works with drag and drop, it is only necessary
to connect to other components of the software.
After importing the file it is possible to see the data loaded with the Data Table
component seen in Figure 3.14.
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Figure 3.14: Original Data Table
The second step is the application of the K-means algorithm. The features chosen for
the grouping are the source ports and destination ports.
For implementation of K-means is needed to choose the number of clusters for its
classification. The software Orange-canvas has a function to apply the k-means and
calculates the most appropriate number of cluster. For our scenario the quantity chosen
was 4, as shown in Figure 3.15.
Figure 3.15: Clusters Orange-Canvas
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The interactive k-means component allows visualization of the implementation of the
algorithm, seen in Figure 3.16, together with the steps that it takes to implement.
Figure 3.16: Interactive k-Means
After K-means is performed in the Scatter Plot component it is possible to see the
features and other attributes, such as the comparison of each cluster with the alert clas-
sification, as in Figure 3.17
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Figure 3.17: Scatter Plot Classification x Cluster
The third step was the creation of a variable class with the created clusters, with the
Create Class component. It was opted to use this component due to the fact that later
on the decision tree algorithm will need a variable class for its execution.
The fourth step are the outliers. They are data that belong to a certain cluster but
are far from the centroids. Due to this dispersion they can be errors in the algorithm or
isolated actions. For this, we use the Outliers component, then classifies the components
as similar or different from the main class. Data that is considered similar falls into the
inliers category and or others into the outliers.
After the outliers are removed, it is possible to see the result in the Data Table (2)
component.
The fifth Step is the separation of each cluster for a more detailed analysis. For this
separation is used the component Select Rows, that uses rules that will be applied in each
line and the obtained results are redirected.
The Sixth Step is the application of the K-means algorithm again in each cluster,
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subdividing the characteristics found to find better patterns.
• Cluster 1: In cluster 1 the number of clusters for the second application of k-means
was a total of 7.
• Cluster 2: In cluster 2 the number of clusters for the second application of k-means
was a total of 2.
• Cluster 3: In cluster 3 the number of clusters for the second application of k-means
was a total of 2.
• Cluster 4: In cluster 4 the number of clusters for the second application of k-means
was a total of 8.
The results found in the subdivisions will be presented in the next chapter.
46 CHAPTER 3. DEVELOPMENT
Chapter 4
Results
In this chapter are discussed the results obtained in the machine learning pixes de-
scribed on, the previous chapter, considering the Outliers and Inliers.
4.1 Inliers
The first results presented are all the clusters and sub-clusters found from the K-means
algorithm. After the first application of the algorithm, it was possible to observe the
creation of 4 main clusters. Its main features are a range of source ports and destination
ports, which can be viewed in the Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Source Port x Destination Port
Follows an individually analysis of each cluster, commenting its characteristics and
actions. In tables will be shown the classifications of the alert, the source IP, destination
IP, source port and destination port.
The classification of alerts is divided into 7 categories:
• A Network Trojan was Detected - this alert is triggered when a known malware
connection is detected on the network.
• Attempted Information Leak - handles signatures of potentially harmful information
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collection attempts. Information leaks or acknowledgment attacks that are classified
as leaked, attempted data are not positive evidence that an attempt to collect
information was successful. Instead, they are a sign that an attempt has been
made.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode - Checks for packets that are not decode as the
standard specifies.
• Misc Attack - Diverse attacks known by IDS, cataloged and blacklisted.
• Misc Activity - diversified activity found in the network, such as anomalies gener-
ating a large number of false positives.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation - This alert is triggered when any activity
that has as a relation with the violation of privacy as collection of information of
the user, IP address valid.
• Potentially Bad Traffic - This alert is triggered when network traffic is potentially
malicious as connections from command and control servers to known botnets.
In the first implementation of the K-means a total of 4 chuster was obtained, and in
each of the clusters the K-means was applied again for an in-depth analysis of the data.
4.1.1 Cluster 1
As depicted on Figure 4.1, Cluster 1 is displayed in blue with a total of 743 alerts,
where the port connection ranges are:
• Source Port: 53 a 30227
• Destination Port: 22 a 16216
In order to further restrict the ports in which the connexions were made, we apply the
algorithm again, generating a total of 7 new clusters as seen in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Sub Clusters 1
Cluster 1.1 has only one alert classification with a total of 6 connections, between 2
source IPS and 1 destination IP as seen in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Cluster 1.1
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Misc Attack 78.128.112.74 193.136.195.94 56964 17743
Misc Attack 5.188.206.248 193.136.195.94 59081 18018
• Misc Attack:
– The IP 78.128.112.74 is listed as malicious by the Collective Intelligence Net-
work Security COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK SECURITY (CINS).
– The IP 5.188.206.248 is on the black list of the Dshield group.
Cluster 1.2 has 2 alerts classification with total of 14 connections, between 3 source
IPS and 5 destination IPS, as seen in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.2: Cluster 1.2
Classification Source IP Destination IP Sorce Port DestinationPort
A Network Trojan
was Detected 193.136.195.94 119.59.124.163 51641 8080
A Network Trojan
was Detected 193.136.195.94 95.110.231.207 56907 8080
A Network Trojan
was Detected 193.136.195.94 178.79.172.45 58624 8080
A Network Trojan
was Detected 192.168.0.162 119.59.124.163 52910 8080
A Network Trojan
was Detected 192.168.0.162 62.75.145.252 54784 8080
Misc Attack 146.185.222.51 193.136.195.94 55632 11359
• A Network Trojan was Detected:
– The IPS 119.59.124.163 and 119.59.124.163 are associated with a command
and control server of the Dridex botnet, but are already deactivated.
– The IPS 95.110.231.207, 178.79.172.45 and 62.75.145.252 are associated with
a command and control server of the Heodo botnet, but are already disabled.
• Misck Attack: 146.185.222.51 is in the black list of the Dshield group.
Cluster 1.3 has 2 alert classifications with a total of 167 connections, between 4 source
IPS and 10 destination IPS seen in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3: Cluster 1.3
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Misc activity 192.168.0.162 8.8.8.8 56279 53
Misc activity 192.168.0.162 8.8.4.4 56157 53
A Network Trojan
was Detected
193.136.195.94 46.163.78.94 54503 443
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 78.47.139.102 58237 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 216.146.43.71 53166 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 216.146.43.70 58248 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 162.88.96.194 57863 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 162.88.100.200 59708 80
Misc Attack 146.185.222.12 193.136.195.94 57912 4105
Misc Attack 5.188.10.103 193.136.195.94 58586 3486
Generic Protocol Command Decode 193.136.195.94 104.17.107.77 58191 443
• Misc activity: IP 192.168.0.162 made requests for Google DNS server (8.8.8.8 and
8.8.4.4) for some malicious Fully Qualified Domain Name.
• Network Trojan was Detected: IP 46.163.78.94 is associated with a command and
control server of the Heodo Botnet, but is already disabled.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation:
– The IPS 216.146.43.71, 216.146.43.70, 162.88.96.194 and 162.88.100.200 are
associated with an Internet service that aims to discover the valid IP of a given
host. This measure is used to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with
the real IP and maintain an active connection with the host.
– The IP 78.47.139.102 simply returns an HTML page with a "works" message
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we believe is a way to verify that the host has an active connection and to get
the source IP of the client.
• Misck Attack: The IPS 146.185.222.12 is in the black list of the Dshield group.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 104.17.107.77 belongs to the What-
sApp domain.
Cluster 1.4 has 5 alert classifications with a total of 330 connections, between 3 source
IPS and 7 destination IPS seen in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Cluster 1.4
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Potentially Bad Traffic 193.136.195.94 8.8.8.8 32589 53
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 78.47.139.102 30785 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 162.88.96.194 34269 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 216.146.38.70 34321 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 162.88.96.194 38407 80
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
193.136.195.94 13.107.4.50 40069 80
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
193.136.195.94 104.17.107.77 37776 443
Misc Attack 80.211.154.197 193.136.195.94 42649 81
Misc Attack 45.55.0.202 193.136.195.94 37400 199
A Network Trojan
was Detected
193.136.195.94 119.59.124.163 43579 8080
• Potentially Bad Traffic: Suspicious requests for Google DNS server (8.8.8.8) for
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some malicious Full Qualified Domain Name.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation:
– IP 78.47.139.102 simply returns an HTML page with a "works" message we
believe is a way to verify that the host is with an active connection and to get
the source IP of the client.
– The IPS 78.47.139.102, 162.88.96.194, 216.146.38.70, 162.88.96.194 are asso-
ciated with an Internet service that aims to find out the valid IP of a given
host. This measure is used to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with
the actual IP and maintain an active connection with the host.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: IPS 13.107.4.50 (windows update) and 104.17.107.77
(WhatsApp), are false positives found in the network.
• Misc Attack: IPS 80.211.154.197 and 45.55.0.202, are listed as malicious by Collec-
tive Intelligence Network Security CINS.
• Network Trojan was Detected: IP 119.59.124.163 is associated with a command and
control server from Botet Drixex.
Cluster 1.5 has 1 alert classification with a total of 4 connections, between 1 source
IP and 1 destination IP seen in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5: Cluster 1.5
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Misc Attack 77.72.82.14 193.136.195.94 43781 25766
• Misc Attack: The IP 77.72.82.14 is associated with the Dshield blacklist.
Cluster 1.6 has 6 alert classifications with a total of 121 connections, between 7 source
IPS and 10 destination IPS as seen in Table 4.6.
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Table 4.6: Cluster 1.6
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
192.168.0.146 169.44.82.118 47492 443
A Network Trojan
was Detected
192.168.0.162 81.88.24.211 52159 443
Misc activity 192.168.0.162 8.8.8.8 49537 53
Misc activity 192.168.0.162 8.8.4.4 51110 53
Misc activity 193.136.195.94 8.8.4.4 50108 53
Misc Attack 176.119.7.54 193.136.195.94 50127 3399
Misc Attack 63.143.33.110 193.136.195.94 47195 5222
Misc Attack 77.72.83.234 193.136.195.94 43644 1020
Misc Attack 5.189.226.102 193.136.195.94 46113 5038
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 78.47.139.102 51380 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 216.146.43.71 50623 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 216.146.43.70 51710 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 198.27.74.146 49671 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 162.88.100.200 51487 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 146.255.36.1 49671 80
Potentially Bad Traffic 193.136.195.94 8.8.8.8 46682 53
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 169.44.82.118 is associated with the
WhatsApp Domain, probably being a false positive
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• Network Trojan was Detected: The IP 81.88.24.211 is associated with a command
and control server of the Heodo botnet, but is already disabled.
• Misc activity: Malicious queries to Google DNS servers (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4)
• Misc Attack:
– The IP 176.119.7.54 is associated with BACKDOOR DoomJuice.
– The IPS 63.143.33.110, 77.72.83.234.5 and 189.226.102 are listed as malicious
by Collective Intelligence Network Security CINS.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation: IPS 78.47.139.102, 216.146.43.71,216,146.43.70,
198.27.74.146, 162.88.100.200 and 146.255.36.1 are associated with a service on the
Internet that aims to discover the valid IP of a given host. This measure is used to
ensure that the Botnet can communicate with the actual IP and maintain an active
connection with the host.
• Potentially Bad Traffic: Malicious requests for known domains.
Cluster 1.7 has 5 alert classifications with a total of 100 connections, between 3 source
IPS and 11 destination IPS seen in Table 4.7.
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Table 4.7: Cluster 1.7
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
A Network Trojan
was Detected
192.168.0.162 103.4.18.170 63313 443
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
192.168.0.162 13.107.4.50 62102 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 162.88.96.194 63871 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 162.88.100.200 65137 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 216.146.38.70 62258 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 216.146.43.71 62141 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 78.47.139.102 64887 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
192.168.0.162 185.26.99.195 61405 3333
Potentially Bad Traffic 192.168.0.162 8.8.8.8 60049 53
Misc Attack 5.189.226.180 193.136.195.94 60000 3389
• Network Trojan was Detected:The IP 103.4.18.170 is associated with a Dridex com-
mand and control server, but is already disabled.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode:The IP 13.107.4.50 is a false positive due to
windows updates.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation: The IPS 162.88.96.194, 162.88.100.200, 216.146.38.70,
216.146.43.71, 78.47.139.102, 185.26.99.195 are associated with a service on the In-
ternet that aims to discover the valid IP of a particular host, this measure is used
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to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with the real IP and maintain an active
connection with the host.
• Potentially Bad Traffic: Queries for Probably Malicious Domains.
• Misc Attack: The IP 5.189.226.180 is associated with the Dshield black list.
4.1.2 Cluster 2
Cluster 2 is visualized with the red color on Figure 4.1, with a total of 1030 alerts the
connection ranges of the ports are:
• Source Port: 53 to 443
• Destination Port: 21289 to 45553
In order to be able to restrict more the ports in which the connections were made, we
apply the algorithm again, generating a total of 2 new clusters seen in Figure 4.3
Figure 4.3: Sub Clusters 2
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Cluster 2.1 has 5 alert classifications with a total of 321 connections, between 12 source
IPS and 2 destination IPS seen in the Table 4.8.
Table 4.8: Cluster 2.1
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
59.38.112.38 192.168.0.162 80 50719
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.43.71 192.168.0.162 80 52737
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.43.70 192.168.0.162 80 52911
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.43.71 193.136.195.94 80 49527
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.100.200 193.136.195.94 80 61816
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.96.194 192.168.0.162 80 57863
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.96.194 193.136.195.94 80 60038
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.100.200 192.168.0.162 80 50128
A Network Trojan
was Detected
8.8.8.8 192.168.0.162 53 53195
A Network Trojan
was Detected
8.8.4.4 192.168.0.162 53 60487
Misc Attack 109.239.79.181 192.168.0.162 9001 50079
Misc Attack 51.68.77.241 193.136.195.94 9001 56530
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
104.17.107.77 193.136.195.94 443 58191
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
13.107.4.50 192.168.0.162 80 62102
• Potentially Bad Traffic: The IPS 162.88.96.194, 162.88.100.200, 216.146.38.70 and
216.146.43.71, are associated with an Internet service that aims to find out the
valid IP of a particular host, this measure is used to ensure that the Botnet can
communicate with the actual IP and maintain an active connection with the host.
• The Network Trojan was Detected: Alert triggered for Domain Name System (DNS)
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requests to Google DNS server 8.8.8.8 to for GameOver ZeuS (GOZ) botnet domains.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 104.17.107.77 belongs to the What-
sApp domain and and 13.107.4.50 is a false positive due to windows updates.
Cluster 2.2 has 1 alert classification with a total of 4 connections, between 2 source
IPS and 1 destination IP seen in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9: Cluster 2.2
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Misc Attack 146.185.222.35 193.136.195.94 48830 58732
Misc Attack 146.185.222.29 193.136.195.94 43671 57135
• Misc Attack: the IP 146.185.222.35 and 146.185.222.29 are associated with the
Dshield black list.
4.1.3 Cluster 3
Cluster 3 is displayed in green, on Figure 4.1, with a total of 139 alerts the connection
ranges of the ports are:
• Source Port: 53 to 30227
• Destination Port: 22 to 16216
In order to restrict the ports in which the connexions were made, we apply the algo-
rithm again, generating a total of 2 new clusters as seen in Figure 4.4.
Cluster 3.1 has 5 alert classifications with a total of 58 connections, between 5 source
IPS and 8 destination IPS as seen in Table 4.10





193.136.195.94 52.210.42.194 16570 80
Misc Attack 82.221.105.7 193.136.195.94 17268 175
Misc Attack 80.82.77.139 193.136.195.94 30227 2152
Misc Attack 41.184.186.216 193.136.195.94 29302 23
Misc activity 193.136.195.94 8.8.8.8 20515 53
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 216.146.38.70 12910 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 162.88.100.200 13007 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 78.47.139.102 14549 80
Potential Corporate
Privacy Violation
193.136.195.94 216.146.43.71 29001 80
Potentially Bad
Traffic
193.136.195.94 8.8.8.8 16643 53
Potentially Bad
Traffic
222.186.15.66 193.136.195.94 24103 3306
Table 4.10: Cluster 3.1
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 52.210.42.194 is linked to the site
"http://www.bsnett.no/"
• Misc Attack: The IPS 82.221.105.7 and 80.82.77.139 are listed as malicious by
Collective Intelligence Network Security CINS.
• Misc activity: Domain Solicitations to Google DNS (8.8.8.8) considered malicious.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation:
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Figure 4.4: Sub Clusters 3
– The IP 78.47.139.102 simply returns an HTML page with a "works" message
we believe is a way to verify that the host is with an active connection.
– The IPS 216.146.38.70, 216.146.43.71 and 162.88.100.200 are associated with
an Internet service that aims to discover the valid IP of a given host, this
measure is used to ensure that the botnet can communicate with the real IP
and maintain an active connection with the host.
• Potentially Bad Traffic: IP 222.186.15.66 made attempts to attack through the
MySQL server.
Cluster 3.2 has alert classification with total of 6 connections, between 14 source IPS
and 9 destination IPS as seen in the Table 4.11.





8.8.4.4 193.136.195.94 53 5927
A Network Tro-
jan was Detected
193.136.195.94 62.210.36.193 1299 8080
Attempted Infor-
mation Leak
104.243.143.70 193.136.195.94 5060 5060
Attempted Infor-
mation Leak
158.69.207.26 193.136.195.94 5063 5060
Attempted Infor-
mation Leak
37.49.231.144 193.136.195.94 5122 5060
Attempted Infor-
mation Leak
62.210.103.172 193.136.195.94 6691 5060
Misc Attack 37.191.196.1 193.136.195.94 11219 22
Misc Attack 71.6.233.14 193.136.195.94 1099 1099
Misc Attack 109.239.79.181 193.136.195.94 9001 1715
Misc Attack 37.49.231.144 193.136.195.94 5122 5060
Misc Attack 196.52.43.90 193.136.195.94 10978 9000
Misc activity 193.136.195.94 8.8.4.4 1124 53








193.136.195.94 216.146.43.71 4734 80












193.136.195.94 185.26.99.195 3745 3333
Potentially Bad
Traffic
223.72.54.251 193.136.195.94 9779 1433
Potentially Bad
Traffic
216.146.43.70 193.136.195.94 80 4241
Potentially Bad
Traffic
162.88.100.200 193.136.195.94 80 6394
Table 4.11: Cluster 3.2
• The Network Trojan was Detected:
– Rule triggered for DNS resolutions to Google DNS servers (8.8.8.8) to GameOver
ZeuS (GOZ) botnet domains.
– The IPS 62.210.36.193 is associated with a command and control server for the
Dridex botnet, but is already disabled.
• Attempted Information Leak: The IPS 104.243.143.70, 158.69.207.26, 37.49.231.144
and 62.210.103.172 are associated with possible network scan attack.
• Misc Attack:
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– The IPS 37.191.196.1, 71.6.233.14 and 37.49.231.144 are listed as malicious by
Collective Intelligence Network Security (CINS).
– The IPS 196.52.43.90, 196.52.43.90 are associated with the Dshield black list.
• Misc activity: The IP 109.239.79.181 is associated with unusual activities in the
network.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation:
– IPS 78.47.139.102, 216.146.43.71 and 162.88.100.200 are associated with an
Internet service that aims to find out the valid IP of a particular host. This
measure is used to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with the actual
IP and maintain an active connection with the host.
– The IPS 163.172.226.137 and 185.26.99.195 have the activity related to Bit-
coins.
• Potentially Bad Traffic:
– The IP 223.72.54.251 may be scanning MSSQL.
– The IPS 216.146.43.70 and 162.88.100.200 in Potentially Bad Traffic category
are responding to DNS queries made by the infected host.
4.1.4 Cluster 4
Cluster 4 is displayed in yellow, on Figure 4.1, with a total of 1030 alerts. The input
ports are in the range of:
• Source Port: 53 a 48830
• Destination Port :49389 a 64108
In order to further restrict the ports in which the connexions were made we apply the
algorithm again, which generated a total of 8 new clusters as seen in the figure4.5
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Figure 4.5: Sub Clusters 4
Cluster 4.1 has 3 alert classifications with a total of 913 connections, between 4 source
IPS and 2 destination IPS as seen in the table 4.12.
Table 4.12: Cluster 4.1
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
104.17.107.77 192.168.0.146 443 37776
A Network Trojan was Detected 8.8.8.8 193.136.195.94 53 34068
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.43.71 193.136.195.94 80 33418
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.96.194 193.136.195.94 80 33418
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 104.17.107.77 belongs to the What-
sApp domain.
• Network Trojan was Detected: Alerts are Google responses related with possible
malicious domains.
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• Potentially Bad Traffic: The IPS 216.146.43.71 and 162.88.96.194 are associated
with an Internet service that aims to discover the valid IP of a particular host.
Cluster 4.2 has 1 alert classification with a total of 4 connections, between 1 source
IP and 1 destination IP as seen in Table 4.13.
Table 4.13: Cluster 4.2
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
A Network Trojan
was Detected
8.8.8.8 193.136.195.94 53 22738
• A network Trojan was Detected: DNS response from Google DNS servers about
possible malicious domains.
Cluster 4.3 has 1 alert classification with a total of 7 connections, between 2 source
IPS and 1 destination IP seen in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14: Cluster 4.3
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.100.200 193.136.195.94 80 45553
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.38.70 193.136.195.94 80 42492
• Potentially Bad Traffic: The IPS 216.146.43.70 and 162.88.100.200 are associated
with an Internet service that aims to discover the valid IP of a given host. This
measure is used to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with the real IP and
maintain an active connection with the host.
Cluster 4.4 has 1 alert classification with a total of 2 connections, between 1 source
IP and 1 destination IP seen in Table 4.15.
Table 4.15: Cluster 4.4
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.38.70 193.136.195.94 80 21289
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• Potentially Bad Traffic: IP 216.146.43.70 are associated with an Internet service that
aims to find out the valid IP of a given host. This measure is used to ensure that
the Botnet can communicate with the real IP and maintain an active connection
with the host.
Cluster 4.5 has alert classification with total of 2 connections, between 1 source IP
and 1 destination IP seen in the Table 4.16.
Table 4.16: Cluster 4.5
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
A Network Trojan
was Detected
8.8.8.8 193.136.195.94 53 24632
• A Network Trojan was Detected: Google DNS response for possible malicious do-
mains.
Cluster 4.6 did not get any alerts.
Cluster 7 has 3 alert classifications with total of 95 connections, between 3 source IPS
and 1 destination IP seen in the Table 4.17.
Table 4.17: Cluster 4.7
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
A Network Trojan
was Detected
8.8.8.8 193.136.195.94 53 39968
Potentially Bad Traffic 162.88.96.194 193.136.195.94 80 40612
Generic Protocol
Command Decode
13.107.4.50 193.136.195.94 80 40069
• Network Trojan was Detected: Google DNS response related with possible malicious
domains.
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• Potentially Bad Traffic: The 162.88.96.194 is associated with an Internet service
that aims to find out the valid IP of a particular host. This measure is used to
ensure that the Botnet can communicate with the real IP and maintain an active
connection with the host.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: The IP 13.107.4.50 represents a false positive
due to Windows updates.
Cluster 8 has 1 alert classification with a total of 4 connections, between 1 source IP
and 1 destination IP seen in Table 4.18.
Table 4.18: Cluster 4.8
Classification Source IP Destination IP Source Port Destination Port
Potentially Bad Traffic 216.146.43.71 193.136.195.94 80 29001
• Potentially Bad Traffic:The IPS 162.88.96.194 and 216.146.43.71 are associated with
an Internet service that aims to find out the valid IP of a particular host. This mea-
sure is used to ensure that the Botnet can communicate with real IP and maintain
an active connection to the host.
4.2 Outliers
Outliers are data that may be anomalies, may not fit into a category or be too far
away from the desired grouping.
The Outliners data obtained in the analyzes has the number of 873 alerts in 7 categories
of Suricata alerts.
• Network Trojan was Detected: A total of 80 alerts were obtained.
• Attempted Information Leak: A total of 6 alerts were obtained.
• Generic Protocol Command Decode: A total of 29 alerts were obtained.
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• Misc Attack: A total of 77 alerts were obtained.
• Misc activity: A total of 90 alerts were obtained.
• Potential Corporate Privacy Violation: A total of 346 alerts were obtained.
• Potentially Bad Traffic: A total of 245 alerts were obtained.
4.3 HIDS
With the alerts column generated by HIDS, we can see the messages it has triggered on
certain events. These messages are important due to the fact that they show the internal
activities that the Host generated.
A total of 18 types of alerts were recorded, shown below, in a total of 3112 registered
alerts.
• Login session opened: This alert is triggered when a session is started on the host.
• New dpkg (Debian Package) installed: This alert is triggered when a new package
is installed in the debian distribution.
• Dpkg (Debian Package) removed: This alert is triggered when a package is removed
in the debian distribution.
• Multiple Windows error events:This alert is triggered when multiple windows errors
are generated.
• OSSEC agent started: This alert is triggered when the OSSEC agent starts.
• OSSEC agent disconnected: This alert is triggered when the agent disconnects.
• Registry Entry Added to the System: This alert is triggered when a log is added to
the system.
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• Registry Integrity Checksum Changed: This alert is triggered when some file has a
change, and can be with some update or intentional change.
• Registry Integrity Checksum Changed Again (2nd time): This alert is triggered
when many changes occur in some file accordingly.
• Service startup type was changed: This alert is triggered when some service changes
its type of execution.
• Successful sudo to ROOT executed: This alert is triggered when the SUDO com-
mand is executed.
• System time changed: This alert is triggered when system time changes.
• Unknown problem somewhere in the system: This alert is triggered when some
problem is found in the system.
• User successfully changed UID to root: This alert is triggered when any user changes
the user ID.
• Windows Audit Policy changed: This alert is triggered when some windows security
policy is changed.
• Windows Logon Success: This alert is triggered when some logon and registered in
the systems
• Windows error event: This alert is triggered when some errors in the windows system
registered.
As measured at the beginning of the chapter, all data analyzed is from the correlation
between NIDS and HIDS, within 2 seconds. The IP 193.136.195.94 is the public address
used of the gateway on the Network Address Translation to connect the machines on the
local network to the Internet. Some activities that we can highlight among this correlation
are described below:
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• The first relation presented happened on the day 2018-08-17 in the interval between
06:00:07 and 06:00:08. The "New dpkg (Debian Package) prompt requested to
install" was triggered at 06:00:07, stating that some package was installed on the
system as early as 06:00:08. The NIDS generated the alert "ET DNS Query for .su
TLD (Soviet Union) Often Malware Related" in the classification of Potentially Bad
Traffic, from IP 193.136.195.94 to 8.8.8.8.
Soon after this alert was registered another event that happened between 06:00:35
and 06:00:37, the alert of the HIDS triggered was the "New dpkg (Debian Package)
installed" and the one of the NIDS was the " Network Trojan was Detected0 "with
DNS origin from Google 8.8.8.8 to the infected VMWARE 193.136.195.94.
• The second relation also occurred on the day 2018-08-17 between the hour of 20:19:10
and 20:19:08. The HIDS alert "Registry Entry Added to the System" was triggered
where a record was added to the system, soon after the NIDS generated the alert
"ET SCAN Sipvicious User-Agent Detected (friendly-scanner)" of the classification
Attempted Information Leak, of origin IP 37.49.231.144 to 193.136.195.94.
After these alerts triggered another HIDS alert "Registry Entry Added to the Sys-
tem" but with the difference in the classification and alert message of the NIDS
that, ET CINS Active Threat Intelligence Poor Reputation IP group 24, classifica-
tion Misc Attack on the same IP cited above.
• The third report presented, occurred on 2018-09-01 in the interval between 19:39:03
and 19:39:05, the NIDS alert "ET DNS Query to a * .pw domain - Likely Hostile"
was triggered regarding the classification Potentially Bad Traffic. This alert is about
possible requests for malicious domains. After this event HIDS triggered the warning
of "Successful sudo to ROOT executed" referring to the sudo command used by the
user. After this, HIDS triggered another alert "User successfully changed UID to
root", which means that the user ID has been changed.
• In the fourth relation presented, occurred on the 2018-09-04 between the schedules
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21:41:26 and 21:41:28, HIDS generated the alert "Windows Logon Success" that rep-
resents a logon in the system. After the NIDS generated the alert "ET TROJAN
ABUSE.CH SSL Blacklist Malicious SSL certificate detected (Dridex)" for classi-
fication "A Network Trojan was Detected". The source IP for this connection is
208.87.225.248 which is classified as an active C&C for the Dridex botnet.
• In the fifth relation presented, occurred on days 2018-08-16 and 2018-08-17, on 2018-
08-16, between the hours of 11:26:25 and 11:26:23, the HIDS fired the alert "Service
startup type was changed", after this alert NIDS began to receive the alert with the
message "ET TROJAN DNS Reply Sinkhole Microsoft NO-IP Domain".
On the day 2018-08-17, at 03:53:04 HIDS received the "Login session opened" alert.
After this session was opened, new packages were installed, at 06:00:35, after 1 pm
and 18 HIDS generated the warning "Dpkg (Debian Package) removed" we believe
that the malware installed its dependencies and soon after its use the program has
removed itself to leave no clues.
We were able to gain insight into the activities found on infected hosts with HIDS
alerts. The vast majority of the activities found were requests for possibly malicious
domains already registered by NIDS, as it already obtains an amount of updated rules
the C&Care disabled, having only 1 in operation and still being able to connect, as
described in Table 4.19. These command and control servers were found on the site
"https://feodotracker.abuse.ch".













The Dridex and Heodo Botnets are two versions of the botnet known as Feodo, a
Trojan used to gain privileged information from the infected computer, such as banking
data and system credentials. There are currently 5 versions:
• Version A: Its main feature is that it is hosted on a Web server running a proxy
for port 8080/TCP, waiting for the connections and relaying the traffic to another
node. Due to this way of acting, Botnet traffic hits the hots without using domain
names, which makes it difficult to detect by the IDS[40].
• Version B: It is also hosted on a web server, acting with the domain names in the
.ru ccTLD. The current traffic usually runs over port 80/TCP[40].
• Version C: In this version there is already a change in the URL structure used for
data transmissions. It is called Geode or Emotet[40].
• Version D: It is currently known as Dridex. Its operation uses a different infrastruc-
ture from the usual command and control servers, but sharing the same logic. In
Dridex the main Botnet is fragmented into small nuclei of logical botnets where
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each one has an identity. This fragmentation is used so that each segment is
responsible by a specific activity such as. Scanning possible targets, direct at-
tacks, theft of information, among others. For more information access the link
"https://www.bitsighttech.com/blog/dridex-botnets"[40].
• Version E: It is the successor of Version C called Heodo. This Botnet is already
directed to multiple actions like DDOS attacks, encrypting the host content, stealing
of information, among others [41]. For more information access the link
"https://fortiguard.com/encyclopedia/botnet/7630295".
With the implementation of the k-means algorithm we can observe that the alerts are
repeated in almost all the clusters, due to the fact that few IPS were registered in the
alerts, and only have 7 categories. Ports detected in alerts usually are associated with
common services such as 443 (https) and 80 (http). In this way the Firewal believes that
they are legitimate traffic, but with malicious activities behind.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter presents the main conclusions, additional work improvements and new
research vectors.
5.1 Conclusion
The main purpose of this work was to analyze how IDS detects Botnets and improve
detection of the related traffic. To achieve that a network topology has been implemented
to capture traffic from malware, focused on detecting the botnets.
In the topology, several components were deployed: i) a NIDS control network traffic;
ii) two HIDS in virtual machines for host-specific controls; iii) a honeypot in the internal
network for the detection of possible attacks from infected VM-wares; and iv) honeypot
in the external network to attract possible malware from the Internet.
Considering the behavior of the Botnet threats it was necessary to overcome the ad-
versities in the choice and implementation of the devices.
The infection phase was challenging because most of the malware found in repositories
is very old and some of the Botnets were already taken down.
It was possible to correlate the alerts between HIDS and NIDS, it is possible to perceive
the infections, such as installing malware and communicating with their C&C.
We used machine learning algorithms to help the classification of Botnet related traffic
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and understand the challenges of detecting it.
It was not possible to observe the contents of the packets, as SSL and IPSEC protocols,
that are being increasingly used for the "security" of the Botnet communication, reaching
directly in the IDS to detect these exchanges of malicious messages.
The honeypot did not get a very positive correlation with IDS detection, because
infected hosts did not try to spread over the network or scan it. This could have happened
due to the fact of during the 3 week time, that the devices were interconnected, the
honeypot did not alert for malware behavior or the malware was not configured to take
those actions.
5.2 Future Work
As future work we can change and implement more types of honeypot in the same
topology, so we can analyze which one has a better performance.
Another future approach is to change the topology to cover more points of attack in
the detection of Malware. The honeypot in the external network can be better analyzed
to find correlation between the attacks received and infections on the internal network.
As during this work the network traffic was captured in the .pcap files, further analysis
can be made to map the behavior of the Botnet directly, such as packet size, and the
average time it communicates with C&C.
We think it can be useful to test diverse machine learning algorithms over the captured
data, and, if possible,to continue to increase the data available and considered other feeds
of information to correlate during the detection phase.
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